



Consuming Threat Intelligence More Effectively

Bri Rolston
GkChick Threat Research
March 2014

Geek Juju?

- Any experience in security?
 - Security operations
 - Code security
 - Incident response
 - Telecomm
 - Critical infrastructure
- Research area → threat intel

Research Biases

My hat is blue....

- Competitive nature of defense
- Operational threat intelligence
- Where my thoughts tend to wander....
 - Trends in malware use & creation
 - Attack surface
 - Attack vector
 - Attack style

Winning from behind the 8-Ball

Threat paradigm → most threat talked about in military terms

- National security risk
 - $\text{Risk} = f(\text{Threat}, \text{Vulnerability}, \text{Consequence})$
- Characterizing--> Taking the intent out of
 - $\text{Threat} = f(\text{Capabilities}, \text{Opportunities}, \text{Intent})$
 - Capabilities = attack techniques & technologies
 - Opportunities = vulnerabilities & problem solving

Shifting Threat Perspective

Threat from industry perspective

- Operational risk
 - Risk = f (Probability, Impact)
- Priorities
 - People
 - Process
 - Technology

Attack Methodology Analysis (AMA)

Previous work in the threat space....

- Threat analysis technique designed for use on computer networks
- More responsive to dynamic state of target's threat profile
- Concentrates threat analysis efforts on known characteristics of the target
- Need to know potential threat of exploit technology rather than the potential threat of an adversary
- 4 stages of analysis process
 - Characterize system and its vulnerabilities
 - Isolate known attack capabilities
 - Research mitigation techniques for potential threats
 - Analyze gap between existing defensive posture and known exploits

Predictive Attack Path Analysis (PAPA)

They attack. I defend. Shiny object!

- **Miscellaneous studies**
 - LEAN & Six Sigma
 - Root cause failure analysis (RCFA)
 - Code security
- **Cyber defense would be more EFFICIENT if I**
 - Stop defending all targets the same way
 - Identify the high value targets on my network first
 - Evaluate the attack surface
- **Tools used**
 - Reversing off the target (software patent)
 - ATAC (attack styles, FSL, ATAC Life Cycle)
 - Adversarial tiers (not done yet)

ATAC Attack Style

Technology is a tool people use to get work done and to solve business problems.

Adversaries	Attack Work Flow	Attack Technology
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Have operational goals• Are creatures of habit• Solve problems uniquely• Plan attacks based on previous factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Makes it possible to characterize threat• Describes the life cycle & work• Drives selection of attack tech	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Shows how adversary solves problems• Can be used to identify most likely attack paths
ATTACK STYLE		

ATAC Life Cycle

Hackers have project managers, too.

Target Development	Exploitation & Pivoting	Attack Operations	Attack EoL
Design	Implementation	Maintenance	EoL
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Work planning• Identify ops goals• Develop attack strategy• Create tool kit	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Point of Entry (PoE)<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Foothold• Elevate privilege• Pivot to next system	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Achieve ops goals• Shift in technical focus• Different technical needs than E&P• Lots of infra.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• End of technical work
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Network mapping• Vuln scanning• Spear-phishing	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• 0-days• Pass the hash• Elev. of Priv. (EoP)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• C&C channels• Keystroke logging• Remote admin	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Clean up



Functional Security Layers (FSL)

We have the data. We need to make it actionable.

- User Roles & Responsibilities (UR&R)
- Physical comms components
- Network comms
- Firmware or embedded devices
- Operating system (OS)
- Virtualization
- Applications (COTS, 3rd party, GPL, etc.)
- Hosting, managed, or cloud services
- Custom or proprietary software
- Data & data stores

Night Dragon vs. Red October

Would response strategy for one be effective for the other?

- **Night Dragon**

- Reported by McAfee in Feb 2011
- 2009 – 2011
- Ran against oil & gas internationally
- Operational goal was exfiltration of strategic business data
- Ended up pulling data from at least one ICS
- PoE execution is beautiful (Tier 1)

- **Red October**

- Reported by Kaspersky in Jan 2013
- 2007 – 2013
- Ran against govt, education, and diplomatic groups internationally
- Operational goal was information gathering
- Not ICS specific but still very cool
- Rootkit & payloads (Tier 1)

Target Development

What technology was managed by the attacker long term?

- Workstations or laptops
- Mobile devices
 - iPhone
 - Nokia
 - Windows Mobile
- Removable disk drives
- Network devices
 - Cisco

Exploitation

How did they get on the network to begin with?

- PoE exploits
 - Exploits developed & used by other teams
 - Exploit code exactly the same
 - Changed out rootkit & payloads
- Initial PoE – 1st choice
 - Spear-phishing email with malicious attachment
 - Office vulns exploited
 - CVE-2009-3129
 - CVE-2010-3333
 - CVE-2012-0158
- Re-acquisition PoE – back up
 - Spear-phishing email redirecting to malicious PHP web site
 - CVE-2011-3544 (Rhino)

Pivoting

How did they pivot to the next stage targets?

- Harvested credentials for custom “Rainbow Tables”
- Custom payload module for identifying next stage targets
- Use browser, browser history, cached browser creds, & FTP client settings for pivot
- Stole creds from FTP client, browsers, mail clients, MS hash

Attack Operations: C&C

How did they get their work done?

- Multi-tiers to prevent take downs
- Lower tiers were proxies & did port forwarding
- At least 60 domains, multiple geo locations
- Infected hosts call out to C&C servers, which triggers download of payloads
- Comms handled by server-side scripts in “cgi-bin” directories (old school!)
- Different encryption algorithms for sending & receiving
- All rootkits have 3 C&C domains hardcoded in code
- C&C domains (old school crimeware!)
 - Dll-host-update.com
 - Msgenuine.net

Attack Operations: Payload

How did they get their work done?

- Dropper used to load rootkit
 - MSC.BAT
 - LHAFD.GCP
 - SVCHOST.EXE –main component
- Plug and play rootkit framework
- Checks to see if lose access to compromised hosts
- Checks for network access (old school!)
 - update.microsoft.com
 - www.microsoft.com
 - support.microsoft.com

Attack Style

How did the attacker use technology to do work?

- Registry trolling
- QA of malware operations
- Re-acquisition of targets
 - Alternate channels
 - Different PoEs
- Proxies to prevent takedown
- Criminal domains used circa 2003
- USB deleted file recovery
- Custom PnP payload loading

Defending Against Red October

Match defenses and detection to the attack life cycle.

- **Exploitation & Pivoting: PoE**
 - Anywhere PDF & MS Office are used
 - Any machine with JVM
- **Attack Operations: C&C**
 - Outbound web requests with encrypted content
 - DNS requests for known bad I.P.s or domains
- **Attack Operations: Payloads**
 - Registry trolling
 - SNMP polling of network devices
 - Outbound requests to Windows update sites
 - File integrity checks for Office, Adobe, and Java

Questions????

If questions = 0

Then presentation = fail

End If

Contact Information

**If you need to catch me after you're
fully caffeinated.....**

Bri Rolston

Chief Research Geek

GkChick Threat Research

gkchick@gmail.com